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REDEEMING THE IMAGE 
Alistair McFadyen 
 
Abstract 
This paper questions conventional assumptions concerning the nature and function of 
formal theological anthropology and its place in the doctrinal corpus. Taking the 
image of God as its focus, the discussion begins by interrogating the assumption that 
understanding of the image (and the task of theological anthropology more generally) 
be framed primarily within the context of a doctrine of creation, often narrowly 
construed. Where a static understanding of creation operates, the image becomes a 
tool for what is consequently regarded the primary task of theological anthropology 
± defining human nature, often in essentialist and universal terms. Alternative 
possibilities are opened through conscious connection with soteriology. Following 
engagement with black theology, feminist theologies and the post-9/11 discussion of 
torture, the argument moves towards a performative, particular and contingent 
understanding of the image and of theological anthropology, drawing both into much 
closer connection with theological ethics than is conventionally the case.  
 
Keywords: image of God; imago Dei; theological anthropology; torture; dehumanisation; 
feminist theology; black theology 
Introduction 
In this paper, I focus on that central trope of Christian theological anthropology, the image of 
God, in order to question some of the assumptions it is tempting to adopt about theological 
anthropology more broadly ± where (and how) LWµVLWV¶LQWKHHFRORJ\RI&KULVWLDQIDLWKDQG
doctrine; how we construe its basic task or function; essentially, what it is for, how we do it 
and what it is we are and should be doing when we do it. I am especially interested in asking 
what the consequences are of setting interpretation of the image (and theological anthropology 
more generally) within the doctrine of creation as its primary context. The image then tends to 
be rendered as an account of originally given human nature or essence (often inalienable and 
static). The task of theological anthropology is then correspondingly construed as one of 
defining humanity, and doing so in essentialising and universally applicable terms.  
I recognise the positive contribution such an understanding of the image has made,  not 
least to the conceptions of human dignity that arguably fund ingrained modern, Western 
cultural assumptions concerning human rights and mutual responsibilities. At the very least, 
the long tradition of interpreting the image in the direction of a universal account of both given, 
essential human nature and human worth allow it to function as an all-too-rare point of contact 
with the assumptions and interests of secular discourses and communities of practice.  
Notwithstanding that, however, I seek to explore here an alternative by asking what difference 
it might make to understand the image and to do theological anthropology explicitly conscious 
of redemption. Following initial consideration of the doctrinal location of theological 
anthropology, the discussion draws on three distinct theological literatures where I shall argue 
we see theological anthropology (and not simply theological ethics) being done in service of 
redemptive transformation: black theology; feminist theology and the post-9/11 theological 
discussion of torture. My hope is that this will open up possibilities for understanding 
theological anthropology as a situated, performative and practical discourse. 
The Habitus of Theological Anthropology 
Creation? 
Christian theological diVFXVVLRQRI µKXPDQQDWXUH¶ is usually located within the doctrine of 
creation. Asking what happens if we do theological anthropology mindful of (better, perhaps ± 
provoked by) the doctrine (and reality) of redemption need not, however, require its relocation 
from one doctrinal locus to another.1 But it does remind us to be mindful of the interrelation of 
creation with redemption (and eschatology). One effect of that mindfulness is resistance to a 
static understanding of creation and of the static understandings of God and of humanity that 
are associated with it. For there is a symbiotic relationship between deficient ways of 
understanding the doctrine of creation and of theological anthropology, where creation is 
construed as a one-off completed action, rather than a continuing and interactive movement of 
God relating to the world creatively. Correspondingly, WKHRORJLFDODQWKURSRORJ\¶V task is then 
construed as providing answers to the anthropological question by furnishing definitions of 
µKXPDQQDWXUH¶. 
In this mutually reinforcing relationship, the doctrine of creation and correlate 
theological anthropologies become isolated from the more expansive interpretive context of 
*RG¶VDFWLYHUHODWLQJWRDQGPRYHPHQWWRZDUGVXV± redemptively and eschatologically as well 
as creatively. Moreover, the strategies of biblical interpretation underpinning theological 
anthropology answering the anthropological question by furnishing accounts of µKXPDQQDWXUH¶
are similarly truncated. Typically, the creation narratives are read in relative isolation from the 
rest of scripture as accounts of origins, functioning as a kind of theological fundament 
conveying key, foundational concepts IRU GHILQLQJ µKXPDQ QDWXUH¶. (Incidentally but 
significantly, God also appears in rather static terms, whose relating and activity are restricted 
to initial, originating agency, rather than an ongoing dynamic of complex interaction with 
creation, not least human creatures, nor yet an internally complex dynamic relationality. The 
depiction of an essentially unrelated God, involved in a one-off act of creativity from which 
*RG FRQVHTXHQWO\ ZLWKGUDZV SURYLGHV QR EDUULHU WR UHQGHULQJ KXPDQLW\ LQ *RG¶V LPDJH LQ
terms of individual, unrelated, decontextualised essence.) 
This tends to make our understanding of creation backward-looking, if not static. 
Similarly, LIWKHRORJLFDODQWKURSRORJ\¶VWDVNLVXQGHUVWRRGDVGHILQLWLRQDOLWLVOLNHO\WRORRN
µback¶ to creation as the point where original, essential nature is given, along with key concepts 
through which that might be brought to expression. It will also tend to have the past as its 
dominant temporal mode. That does not make a relationship to redemption impossible. But it 
does make it likely that redemption will be construed in terms of a restoration of the one 
essential human nature already given and shared by all: as an undoing of the damage caused 
through the brokenness of concretely lived humanityµWUDQVIRUPHGEDFNLQWRZKDWLWVKRXOG
KDYHEHHQ¶.2 If we construe the task of theological anthropology as one of definition, we are 
                                                 
1  ,Q WKLV UHJDUG DW OHDVW P\ SURSRVDO GLIIHUV VRPHZKDW IURP 'DYLG .HOVH\¶V WKRXJK WKH LQWHQWLRQV DQG
consequences of his argument are in line with my own. See David H. Kelsey, "Wisdom, Theological 
Anthropology, and Modern Secular Interpretation of Humanity," in God's Life in Trinity, ed. Miroslav Volf and 
Michael Welker (Philadelphia: Augsburg Fortress, 2006); Eccentric Existence: A Theological Anthropology, 2 
vols. (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009), Ch.4B. 
2 Alistair McFadyen, "Healing the Damaged," in Essentials of Christian Community: Essays for Daniel W. Hardy, 
ed. David F. Ford and Dennis L. Stamps (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1996). This seems to be the earlier vision of 
Ruether, expressed in Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk: Towards a Feminist Theology  (London: 
SCM Press, 1983), p.93. 
WHPSWHGWRZDUGVDQHVVHQWLDOLVWDFFRXQWRIKXPDQQDWXUHµWKH¶DQVZHUWRµWKH¶DQWKURSRORJLFDO
question. And no matter whether or what the practical situation that prompts us to reach for an 
answer, we are likely to see ourselves as invited to respond by providing an essentialist and 
universally applicable definition of human nature, sourced by and located in an understanding 
of creation construed LQQDUURZDQGVWDWLFWHUPVWRµORRNEDFN¶WRWKHSRLQWDWZKLFKKuman 
nature was defined by God in creation as a one--off act of origination. 
That Genesis 1-3 risks being mis-read if either isolated from the rest of the Bible or 
positioned in a too dominant interpretive role is a recurrent theme in scholarly discussion, and 
it may be helpful briefly to consider biblical scholarship in this regard. 3  A major issue, 
especially in more theologically interested exegesis, has been the proper contextualisation of 
the Genesis creation narratives in the broader dynamics of the faith of Israel: the living faith 
which stands behind the texts, themselves functioning as a vehicle expressing and regulating 
the living faith of the community in its continuing encounter with God. An immediate 
consequence of such concern is an entrenched theological resistance to a narrow reading of the 
creation theme. This has two aspects. First, a theology of creation is seen to be distributed more 
extensively throughout the Hebrew Scriptures. It is to be found also especially in the wisdom 
tradition and some Psalms, and these are considered to be at least as (and often more) 
authoritative for a reading of creation and of creatureliness as Gen.1-6HFRQG*RG¶VUHODWLQJ
LQDQGWKURXJKFUHDWLYHJHQHUDWLYHDFWLYLW\LVLWVHOIVHWLQFRQQHFWLRQZLWK*RG¶VUHODWLQJZLWK
creatures in ways which it would be misleading to categorise under the rubric of creation, 
narrowly construed; rather, rendered primarily under covenantal, eschatological and 
soteriological motifs. Both aspects in fact point to a reading of Gen.1-3, and interpretation of 
LWVQDUUDWLYHDQGWKHRORJLFDOWURSHVLQWKHEURDGHUFRQWH[WRI*RG¶VLQWHUDFWLRQZLWKWKHZRUOG
Immediately, this contextualises the trope of creation in a way that leads away from static and 
essentialist, towards dynamic, interactive and relational ± therefore also risky, open and 
temporalised ± construals of God, humanity and the world. Precisely for this reason, God, 
world and humanity are to be sought through interrogative encounter that is itself part of that 
interactive encountering and relating in which they are what they are and will be and which is 
amply evidenced throughout the whole corpus of the Hebrew Scriptures. In such encounter, we 
find God and humanity rendered in highly specific, particular and differentiated situations. We 
do not therefore find humanity narrated in terms of essentialized, universal human nature ± a 
nature abstracted equally from the relation to God as material, cultural and social conditions 
and contexts of existence. Instead, we find specific human beings, being-related-to-by and 
relating to God in the determinate particularity and situatedness of their total beings. This 
ambiguous, contingent, situated particularity and contingency of actual human beings is 
narrated in ways that does not easily lend itself to distilling in the direction of abstract, universal 
definitions of human nature in answer to the anthropological question. Rather, it nourishes and 
invites asking the anthropological question in the unrestricted range of situations in which 
human beings find themselves ± or, better, in which they are found and related to creatively by 
God in all their particularity.  
Redemption? 
Biblically, one way in which redemption is narrated is as *RG¶V DFWLYH PRYHPHQW WRZDUGV
particular human beings¶ µFU\LQJRXW¶WR*RGIRUGLYLQHDVVLVWDQFH, individually or collectively, 
                                                 
3 On this and what follows, see Phyllis A. Bird, ""Male and Female He Created Them": Gen 1:27b in the Context 
of the Priestly Account of Creation," The Harvard Theological Review 74, no. 2 (1981); Claus Westermann, 
Genesis 1-11, 2nd ed. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesselschaft, 1976); Gerhard Von Rad, Theology of the 
Old Testament, 2 vols. (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2001); Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. III/1 
(Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1958), pp.42-:DOWHU%UXHJJHPDQQ7KH/RVVDQG5HFRYHU\RIµ&UHDWLRQ¶LQ2OG
Testament Theology," Theology Today 53(1996). 
in situations where their very humanity is somehow at risk or in serious and genuine question, 
beyond human intervention or remedy. Talk of redemption turns our attention towards 
situations and conditions of dehumanisation; situations where humanity is so severely damaged 
that it has collapsed or is at serious risk of collapse. What difference might it make to 
theological anthropology, not only to essay answers to the anthropological question in such 
contexts, but to seek to understand what it might mean to ask the question of the human in 
situations where it is in real question, where there are human cries and flourishing humanity or 
even humanity itself appears counterfactual possibility? If redemption might in part be 
XQGHUVWRRGDV*RG¶VDFWLYHPRYHPHQWWRZDUGVKXPDQEHLQJVLQVXFKUDGLFDOGLVWUHVVWKDWWKH\
µFU\RXW¶WR*RG, what sort of difference does that make to our understanding of theological 
anthropology and its task? 4  of how to ask and answer the anthropological question 
theologically?5 This can only mean wisdom as a form of embodied thinking and practice in 
relation to our own situatedness in ways that constantly provoke new seeking, new 
engagements and new questioning, stretched by the abundant reality of God to seek the fullness 
of humanity in response ± as, indeed, that is actively sought by God, especially but not only in 
conditions where humanity is denigrated, damaged, denied, distorted, disoriented, limited. 
In situations that are WKHWDUJHWRI*RG¶VUHODWLQJUHGHPSWLYHO\LQUHVSRQVHWRKXPDQ
µFULHV¶ KXPDQLW\ LV QRW VRPHWKLQJ VWUDLJKWIRUZDUGO\ LQ H[LVWHQFH 5DWKHU LV LW D SRVVLELOLW\
actively being sought through engagement that resists the energies of dehumanisation, working 
in and through human damage and brokenness by energizing more abundant possibilities of 
human flourishing that are captured by the image of a return to the conditions of original 
creation.6 This suggests that the task of theological anthropology cannot be to proceed as 
though humanity were a fixed, known or even knowable datum, a conceptual deposit 
retrievable IURP *RG¶V RULJLQDO DFW RI FUHDWLRQ awaiting more adequate description or 
abstraction of universal, defining properties.  Rather, humanity is more a quality to be sought 
and worked out in the contingencies of concrete situations. If humanity is not fully realised, 
not unambiguously or securely in existence, then the task of anthropological discourse is not 
so much to describe humanity as actively to seek it; indeed, to seek it in its fullest and most 
extensive realisationDVHHNLQJWKDWIROORZVUHIOHFWVRQDQGLQVWUXPHQWDOO\DFFRPSDQLHV*RG¶V
own seeking of full humanisation focused most intently on precisely those situations where 
humanity seems more an absence than it does a presence.  
This begins to suggest that the task of theological anthropology set consciously in the 
context of redemption might not be so much definitive or taxonomic as performative; not so 
much defining as actively seeking humanity, focused on those places and those human beings 
where human cries report its denial, denigration, damage, disorientation or total collapse; where 
God is already actively seeking flourishing humanity in response. 
Thinking the human in the context RI *RG¶V UHODWLQJ WR XV UHGHPSWLYHO\ VXJJHVWV D
corresponding shift in both dominant tense and grammatical mood of theological discourse 
about humanity: from the present and indicative to the future of the optative (combined with 
the interrogative, since humanity and humanisation are possibilities to be sought and worked 
out within the contingencies and particularities of a specific situation). That change is borne of 
                                                 
4 See David F. Ford, Christian Wisdom: Desiring God and Learning in Love  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), pp.93ff. 
5 One answer is of course given in Ps.8, where the anthropological question is provoked by and in response to 
*RG¶VµPLQGIXOQHVV+HUH WKHKXPDQEHFRPHVDTXHVWLRQDQGTXHVWLRQDEOHLQOLJKWRI*RG¶VPRYHPHQWWRZDUGV
humanity redemptively, creatively and eschatologically. And the answer given to the anthropological question is 
not in the form of a definition of human nature; rather, it is performative: the singing of the Psalm itself. See 
further, Alistair McFadyen, "Imaging God: A Theological Answer to the Anthropological Question?," Zygon 47, 
no. 4 (2012).  
6 See further "Healing the Damaged; cf. also Bound to Sin: Abuse, Holocaust and the Christian Doctrine of Sin  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), Ch.9-10. 
the way in which redemption almost inevitably expresses or itself changes the way in which 
we are attentive to the present, with an eye on future transformation. For the sake of clarity, I 
HPSKDVLVH WKDW WKH µSUHVHQW¶ WKDW PRWLYDWHV WDON RI UHGHPSWLRQ DQG WR ZKLFK UHGHPSWLYH
discourse is oriented, is specific and particular. Theological anthropological discourse under 
the rubric of creation, narrowly conceived, that understands its task as taxonomic definition 
has tended to work through essentialised accounts of human nature considered to be universal. 
The Image of God in Theological Anthropology 
Arguably, nowhere has that tendency towards taxonomy through essentializing definition been 
more pronounced than in relation to the central trope of Christian theological anthropology, the 
image of God. Despite the fact that the image came to occupy such a predominant position in 
Christian anthropology on Christological (and so soteriological) grounds, it has most frequently 
been pulled into the orbit of the doctrine of creation (often narrowly conceived) once 
christologically grounded soteriology has identified its key term. The image then all too easily 
functions as a placeholder concept to be conceptually filled in order to provide an essentialised 
account of human nature given at creation, a definitional answer to the anthropological question 
being construed as the task of theological anthropology. 
Yet, at the same time, it has often been exactly those essentialiing renderings of the 
image in the direction of an account of universal human nature that have most frequently been 
operationalised in ways that have had significant consequences for practice in the cause of 
resisting dehumanisation. Even before the rise of dignity and human rights discourses to the 
centre of modern, Western culture and politics, with which it has an arguable germinal 
association,7 the image of God has a long history of being deployed protectively to prevent or 
release human beings from dehumanising treatment.  
On the face of it, then, considering the theme of this paper in relation to the image of 
God might both exemplify and problematise my basic position. I am going to say just a little 
more here about the tradition of interpreting the image, sufficient to provide a basis for further 
discussion.  
  Where the task of theological anthropology is construed as defining human nature, the 
assumption that we are seeking qualities uniquely held and which differentiate humans from 
other creatures seems only intensified by turning to the image of God as its vehicle.8 Used as a 
tool for discerning and expressing human uniqueness in terms of similarity to, or the sharing 
of characteristics with, or having the capacity appropriately to respond to, God has tended to 
                                                 
7 For both sides of the argument, see Roger Ruston, Human Rights and the Image of God  (London: SCM Press, 
2004). Cf. the discussion of Jeremy Waldron, "The Image of God: Rights, Reason, Order," in Christianity and 
Human Rights: An Introduction, ed. Jr John Witte and Frank S. Alexander (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010). 
8 The assumption that definition focuses on distinctiveness and uniqueness to the exclusion of commonality and 
connection already privileges the image over creatureliness. Construing the image in terms of higher cognitive, 
spiritual or moral capacities of potent self-determination  then pulls understanding of the image in the opposite 
direction from creatureliness, marked by dependence. Not least among the consequences are the interpretation of 
µGRPLQLRQ¶ OLQNHG ZLWK RXU EHLQJ LQ *RG¶V LPDJH RXU UHODWLRQVKLS WR WKH HDUWK DQG WR RWKHU FUHDWXUHV RXU
relationship to our bodies and embodiedness; the devaluing of passivity and giftedness in relation to God; the 
devaluing of nature and negative valorization of human beings seen as closer to or tied to nature than spirit/culture 
(women; indigenous peoples). The location of most discussions of the image primarily within the doctrine of 
creation, seems insufficient of itself to exert significant pressure to articulate the image in relation to a rich and 
thick understanding of creatureliness. Correspondingly, it is tempting here to construe salvation in terms of 
freedom from the material, the body, its dependencies but also all the particularising conditions of embodiment, 
which seems to be a disabling limitation inauthentically imprisoning us in a too animal life. 
render the image in ways that emphasise aspects of human subjectivity.9  Sometimes the image 
has been deployed without any specifiable content, more or less as an indicator that there is 
something sacred about each human being that confers dignity; dignity that is inalienable 
because conferred by God. Even without specification, however, the dignity-conferring 
HOHPHQWVHHPVJHQHUDOO\WREHWDNHQWRUHVLGHµZLWKLQ¶HDFKLQGLYLGXDOSHUVRQDQGWKHUHIRUHWR
point to their internal, µnonmaterial¶ FRQVWLWXWLRQ 0RUH W\SLFDOO\ µKLJKHU-RUGHU¶ FRJQLWLYH
capacities such as rationality, consciousness, deliberative freedom are identified as that within 
each one of us that images God. The emphasis on subjectivity is a significant facilitator in the 
construction of accounts of human nature assumed to be universal ± to apply to all human 
beings in all times and places. For this internal, supposedly universal, subjectivity will be 
instantiated in all human beings, regardless of any variations in body or embodiment.  
Dignity in the Image 
It is this way of understanding the image that has grounded strong currents of commitment to 
the idea of a natural, inalienable dignity residing within each individual human being that can 
be found in several overlapping strands of Christian theology and ethics. That notion has been 
used protectively to secure the dignity and assert the rights of some human beings in situations 
where they have been subject to systematically dehumanizing treatment by others ± situations, 
LQRWKHUZRUGVZKHUH*RG¶VDFWLQJWRZDUGVDQGRXUWDONRIUHGHPSWLRQare needed. The image 
of God has been deployed, for instance, to resist and object to the treatment of native peoples 
by conquistadors; the enslavement of Africans by Europeans and white Americans. Similarly, 
those subject to oppressive dehumanisation have also asserted their own rights and dignity by 
claiming their humanity with reference to the image of God.  
The enslavement of Africans and colonial treatment of indigenous peoples was 
legitimated in significant part by their exclusion from the circumference of humanity delineated 
by a definition of humanity in the image of God, centred on the possession of higher cognitive 
capacities. It was the perceived absence of rationality (or, at least, its presence in undeveloped, 
more animular forms) in non-Europeans that was used to justify their enslavement and other 
forms of degradation and violence: perceived either as closer to the beasts than to God, as more 
body than spirit (and therefore incapable of producing culture worthy of respect), or as 
XQGHYHORSHGDQGµVWXFN¶ LQDFKLOGOLNHVWDWH ZKLFKFRXOGDOVR WKHQEHVXEMHFWRI(XURSHDQ
projection and fantasy).10  1 Consequently, their bodies were liable to be used as beasts of 
burden, to be slaughtered, else converted and otherwise subject to European, Christian 
paternalism.  
Similarly, where women have been seen as incapable of or deficient in the supposedly 
higher cognitive capacities or conditions of subjectivity definitive of being in the image, they 
                                                 
9 The distinction between what are often called 'structural' and 'functional' understandings of the image is less 
relevant to my argument than might be supposed. Functional interpretations have a more dynamic intention, it is 
true, pointing to the utilsation of higher-order human capacities in order actively to enter relation with God. 
However, possession of such capacities by each individual human being tends to occupy much more attention 
than the purpose for which these capacities exist. The overwhelming interest in defining human nature as 
something that might be created for active relating to God, but actually subsists in the individual human being 
apart from such activation, means that ± in practice and from the perspective of this paper ± they share core 
characteristics with structural approaches, seeking to identify parallel correspondences between divine and human 
subjectivity. Both approaches point towards the same set of subjective capacities and both operate 
overwhelmingly under the auspices of the doctriQHRIFUHDWLRQQDUURZO\FRQFHLYHG)RUW\SRORJLHVRIWKHLPDJH¶V
interpretation in the tradition, see, e.g., Douglas John Hall, Imaging God: Dominion as Stewardship  (Grand 
Rapids: Wm B. Eerdmans, 1986); Marc Cortez, Theological Anthropology: A Guide for the Perplexed  
(Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2010). 
10 Dwight N. Hopkins, Down, up, and Over: Slave Religion and Black Theology  (Minneapolis: Fortress Press), 
pp.38ff; Harry H. Singleton, Black Theology and Ideology: Deideological Dimensions in the Theology of James 
H. Cone  (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 2002), pp.5f. 
have been excluded from the possibilities of full participation in human life, especially those 
aspects requiring significant exercise of reason; associated with the perceived limitations of 
bodily identities as opposed to enjoying the freedoms of disembedded abstract reasoning.11 
Where dehumanisation, oppression, marginalization are predicated on exclusion from 
(and domination12 by those included in) the definition of humanity articulated through an 
interpretation of the divine image, an insistence on inclusion in the image, on the grounds that 
its definitional terms apply equally to the excluded group, has proved an effective (though 
sometimes painfully slow-burning) strategy. We find exactly this strategy in European 
Christian opposition to slavery,13 and in the self assertions of black14 and feminist15 theologies. 
I do not wish to question this strategy as an effective means for visualizing and energizing 
possibilities of redemptive transformation in specific circumstances. At the moment, I simply 
make the obvious observation that such strategies not only leave the specific definition of the 
image intact, but leave unquestioned that the task of theological anthropology generally is 
definitional and the task in relation to the image of God, therefore, is to fill this conceptual 
placeholder with sufficient definitional content. I point this out now in order to flag the 
movement of my argument, which explores the possibility that both the task of theological 
anthropology and working out what it means to image God might have more to do with the 
practical consequences of deploying the image in resistance to slavery, oppression or 
marginalization than with its substantive, conceptual formulation. 
In Whose Image? 
A sense of exactly this possibility of re-conceiving the task of theological anthropology in 
performative rather than definitional terms I think can be glimpsed underlying (though often 
unexpressed in)  some of the critiques of the dominant rendering of the image in black, feminist, 
contextual and liberation theologies. Here the self-assertion of humanity does not take the form 
of an argument to be incorporated under present definition. Rather, attention is drawn towards 
the material conditions of theological production that have deployed an understanding of 
humanity and interpretation of the image that is not an abstract universal as presented, rather 
reflects the experience and projects the self-understanding of those who have enjoyed the 
social, cultural, ecclesial and economic power to have steered the dominant tradition. Assertion 
of humanity on the established terms of the tradition would represent incorporation under 
falsely universalised norms, and consequently could not in reality be a form of self-assertion; 
nor, ironically, of that self-direction that the prevailing definition focused on higher cognitive 
capacities make definitive of human being. Feminist theologies have been especially clear and 
especially vocal in critiquing the emphasis on rationality16 and an understanding of the human 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, pp.93f., 109ff., 13f; Women-Church: Theology and Practice of 
Feminist Liturgical Communities  (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 1985), pp.70ff., 170; Michelle A. Gonzalez, 
Created in God's Image: An Introduction to Feminist Theological Anthropology  (Maryknoll: Orbis, 2007), pp.xx, 
114f., 21f., 25ff; Tina Beattie, Woman  (London: Continuum2003), p.96. 
12 Hopkins, Down, up, and Over, p.17; Ruether, Women-Church, p.107, 29; Gonzalez, Created in God's Image, 
pp.86f. 
13 David Brion Davis, In the Image of God: Religion, Moral Values, and Our Heritage of Slavery  (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 2001), p.198 suggests a reciprocal relatioship between interpretations of the image (or 
at least its centrality) and abolitionism. 
14 See, e.g., James Deotis Roberts, Liberation and Reconciliation: A Black Theology  (Louisville: Westminster 
John Knox Press, 2005), pp.34, 53f; A Black Political Theology  (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1974), 
pp.67, 74ff., 86ff., 100. 
15 Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, pp.102ff.describing a liberal feminist position. 
16 Disability theologies have also problematised definitions that privilege and presuppose, not just rational but 
physical capacities, often reflecting in very subtle ways on the complexities of reinterpreting the image, 
redemption and eschatology. See e.g., Beth Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology: Embodied Limits and 
Constructive Possibilities  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Medi Ann Volpe, "Irresponsible Love: 
that privileges, not just rationality, but a particular interpretation of it, that celebrates detached 
abstraction, withdraws rational souls from bodies and thereby all means of embodiment in 
social as well as material worlds, individuals from relationships. 
Black and feminist theologies adopting this sort of critique of the image can be 
understood (and can, indeed, function) as expanding and redefining the image and the 
associated understanding of humanity, rather than challenging or dispensing with the 
assumption that the task of theological anthropology is essentially one of definition or that the 
image functions as a definitional device. However, in their strongest currents, as well as 
problematizing prevailing definition that falsely universalises a partial experience, 
understanding and definition of humanity, they are also questioning (sometimes only 
implicitly) the possibility of providing substantive, non-contextual definitions of the human; 
definitions that are supposedly universal, abstracted and disembedded from the particularities 
and contingencies of human lives and their specific material, social, cultural embodiment 
which both shape and mis-shape our humanity concretely. Human difference, contingency and 
particularity, borne by our different bodies and material, cultural and social embodiment, are 
part of what it means to be human.17 And that gets pretty close to suggesting that there is no 
universal, context-independent human nature. That, in turn, makes the work of definition ± if 
that is still what one thinks one is about ± very different indeed. So different, perhaps, that I 
wonder whether what is really involved is a leap into an understanding of the task of theological 
anthropology as something different from the taxonomic interest in definition.18 In situations 
where fully flourishing humanity is a counterfactual, feminist and black theologies articulate 
theological anthropology by emphasizing relationality ± often, though not always, by 
redefining the image of God. This is quite different, it seems to me, from the turn to relationality 
as it sometimes appears in mainstream theological anthropology, where the image is redefined 
in relational terms in correspondence with the internal relationality of the triune God ± where 
the quality of relationship intended between human beings corresponds to that within the 
godhead, repeating the kind of noetic, platonic parallelism that we find in structural approaches. 
What is missing sometimes is a connection between the human relationality that images God 
and the active relating of the triune God with the world creatively, redemptively and 
eschatologically. Despite the emphasis on relationality, the relationship between imaging of 
God and God is a static one, the grammatical sense and mood present indicative.19  
Feminist, black, liberation and other contextual theologies are written, not only from 
the perspectives of those marginalized or excluded from the theological tradition, but out of an 
experience of dehumanisation and oppression; written, moreover, out of and as an active 
commitment towards redemptive transformation and human flourishing. The relational 
understanding of humanity, even when it is offered in the form of a revised definition of the 
image, is intended performatively. The tense is future; the mood a combination of the optative 
and interrogative (since the possibility of humanisation is to be sought out in the contingent 
uncertaintiHVRI WKHSUHVHQW WKURXJK µULJKW UHODWLQJ¶ WRZDUGV WKHRSHQIXWXUH7he dominant 
                                                 
Rethinking Intellectual Disability, Humanity and the Church," Modern Theology 25, no. 3 (2009); Molly C. 
Haslam, A Constructive Theology of Intellectual Disability  (New York: Fordham, 2012), Ch.5; Hans S. Reinders, 
Receiving the Gift of Friendship: Profound Disability, Theological Anthropology, and Ethics  (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2008), esp. pp.227-38. 
17 John M. Hull, "Blindness and the Face of God: Towards a Theology of Disability," in The Human Image of 
God, ed. Hans-Georg Ziebertz, et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2001); Karen Teel, Racism and the Image of God  (New York: 
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(Cleveland: The Pilgrim Press, 2001). 
18  James Cone makes this explicit in refusing an understanding of rationality and freedom abstracted from 
rebellion and struggle against a  racially oppressive society. James Cone, A Black Theology of Liberation: Fortieth 
Anniversary Edition  (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2010), Ch.5. 
19 Cf. Alistair McFadyen, "The Trinity and Human Individuality," Theology XCV, no. Jan/Feb (1992). 
location of the image is redemptive or eschatological; that is, intended to serve practically in 
the cause of redemptive transformation. Where we have descriptions here, they are proleptic, 
not so much describing a humanity already firmly in place as facilitating, visualizing and 
energizing enacted commitment in practice towards redemptive transformation of the 
conditions of humanisation, often through membership of redemptive community.20  
The Post-9/11 Torture Literature 
Through the discussion so far, I have been moving towards and experimenting with the 
possibility that theological anthropology be understood as a performative and transformative, 
rather than definitional, discourse: its tense future; its mood, optative. I turn now, seeking to 
test and explore this possibility further, albeit briefly, to the post-9/11 English-language 
discussion of torture in theology and Christian ethics. Digging beneath the surface of this 
discussion, I believe we can see significant clues pointing towards a similarly expansive 
understanding of the task of theological anthropology, signing us also towards a performative 
understanding of imaging God as the active seeking of humanity in situations of complex and 
comprehensive dehumanisation. 
I have chosen this literature partly because it is much smaller and more contained than 
the literatures I have been referring to in the discussion up to this point. In addition, it has the 
further advantage of being narrowly focused on a single issue. That single issue, moreover, is 
one where we are likely to find theological anthropology being deployed in relation to practice 
in a specific context. Although torture is an issue that might be considered to belong primarily 
to theological genres focused on practice (e.g., Christian ethics), any discussion of torture 
inevitably requires explicit thematisation of the human. Theological discussion therefore finds 
itself reaching for or assuming an underlying theological anthropology. Moreover, the post-
9/11 discussion of torture is non-abstract in a further sense too. It reflects and arises from the 
material conditions of theological production, the embodiment and embeddedness of theology 
and theologians in a specific geopolitical (read often explicitly also as a theopolitical) context 
in relation to a specific material practice. 
The literature is (almost21) united in judging torture so intrinsically iniquitous that it is 
deemed indefensible in any circumstances. What makes it indefensible is its interpretation as 
an attack on the very humanity of the human being. Generally speaking, the discussion operates 
with an understanding of torture consonant with definitions in international legal instruments, 
involving very severe levels of pain, injury and/or psychological, spiritual or physical harm. 
Consequently, the effects of torture are described as threatening ± and sometimes realizing ± 
the deconstruction or dehumanisation of its victims.22 Almost universally, Christian resistance 
to and critique of torture are grounded in theological anthropology, brought into operational 
contact with the phenomenon by explicit allusion to the image of God. The image is deployed 
in resistance both to the dehumanisation that torture transacts and the demonisation of victims 
and potential victims that prepares for, accompanies and facilitates it. The image can serve this 
function of countering or resisting demonizing dehumanisation because it is presented in a way 
                                                 
20 Hopkins, Down, up, and Over, pp.226ff. speaks of Jesus as the spirit of liberation, which is then identified as 
the image of God within oppressed 'black folk' which presses towards the construction of a new society; George 
C. L. Cummings, "The Slave Narratives as Source of Black Theological Discourse: The Spirit and Eschatology," 
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that affirms ± indeed, sacralises ± the inherent dignity of the human person.23 Torture is then 
represented as that which attacks and can damage (or destroy?) the God-given, dignity-
conferring core of human being, presented explicitly or assumed implicitly as an assault on the 
image. 
So far, this appears to be a very straightforward operational deployment of the image 
as a carrier of human dignity, functioning within the ambit of the doctrine of creation, narrowly 
construed, conferring natural rights in a protective way. This looks like a definitional use where 
humanity appears as though it were a known and fixed datum, securely in existence and to be 
protected. That judgement about the literature has more than a grain of truth about it. And yet 
I think there is something more ambiguous and more complex going on in this literature. 
There is in fact very little interest shown in this literature in explicit, substantive 
definitions of the image. Almost universally, the image is devoid of specified content, 
functioning more as a vague placeholder for affirming that both the image and the dignity it 
confers on the individual are inalienable (because they are the gift of God). 24  It is that 
affirmation that protects the individual from assaults on dignity.  
Except that cannot be quite correct can it? The torture literature actually assumes, and 
sometimes makes explicit, that the reason torture is a moral and a theological issue is precisely 
that it DOES have the capacity to deconstruct the human, to alienate a person from their 
imaging of God. The image sustains a sense of inherent dignity deserving of respect, but what 
makes the assertion of that respect so urgent is that circumstances pertain in which the image 
and the dignity it affords are being disrespected, with consequences that might be expressed in 
terms of serious damage to the humanity of the tortured person, or in theological terms, to the 
image of God. In other words, we are presented here not just with an assertion of dignity as a 
bulwark against affronts that have no capacity seriously to damage, disorient and disorder our 
humanity; rather DVDPHDVXUHRIWRUWXUH¶VSRZHUnot just to visit indignities on us, but actually 
to disrupt, deconstruct and perhaps even to destroy our humanity: to make us undignified. 
This element is mainly implicit in much of the literature, which after all is focused on 
preventing the torture of future potential victims. But it is brought to chillingly powerful 
H[SUHVVLRQLQ'LDQD2UWL]¶WHVWLPRQ\ZKHUHVKHUHFRXQWVhow she lives without the image of 
*RGRUUDWKHUVKHOLYHVLPDJLQJWKHµGHDG*RG¶ having internalised the commentary of the 
Guatamalen policeman who was the first to rape KHUµ\RXU*RGLVGHDG¶ And in place of an 
image of the living God she lives with a symbol of the one bit of agency she has left in relation 
to her torture (except of course her commitment to testify and bear witness on behalf of other 
Guatamalen victims and survivors) ± the razor blade that was an instrument of protection but 
is now potentially an instrument of her own death.25 Several other contributors to the discussion 
of torture post-9/11 draw attention to the way in which torture involves the exercise of absolute 
power over the victim rendered completely vulnerable, constructing a totalitarianµGHPRQLF¶ 
                                                 
23 David P. Gushee, "Against Torture," Theology Today 63(2006): pp.355f; "The Contemporary U.S. Torture 
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notion of dignity grounded in the image of God is interchangeable with secular, including Kantian, construals (so, 
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25 Diana Ortiz, "Theology, International Law, and Torture," Theology Today 63(2006): pp.345f. 
framework by blocking access to transcendent frameworks of meaning as well as of 
assistance. 26  2UWL]¶ WHVWLPRQ\ HYLGHQFHV KRZ WKDW WRWDOLWDULDQ IUDPHZRUN can  follow the 
survivor ORQJ DIWHU WRUWXUH¶V DFWLYH FHVVDWLRQ. The meanings embedded in torture are 
internalised in WKHYHU\FRUHRIRQH¶VLGHQWLW\DQGVHQVHRIRQHVHOIDVDKXPDQEHLQJ. In place 
of the image of the living God sits the image of a µdead God¶DQGLQRQH¶VOLYLQJ one images 
(or at least believes oneself to image) that µGHDWK¶. Not the image of the crucified, which in 
light of the resurrection might be a redemptive and transformative presence, but the God who 
abandoned her who effectively died, who is present to her only as death.27 
Both aspects of what is presented here suggest strongly that the literature implicitly 
operates in the context of redemption, at least as much as creation, and that its interest in 
deploying the image is not primarily after all definitional. Humanity is not thematised as a fixed 
and definite datum, securely in place. Where humanity is subject to significant harm, has 
collapsed, is absent ± there theological discourse has to function beyond the confines of the 
straightforwardly moral, distinguishing between right and wrong conduct. Rather, the situation 
GHVFULEHGDVGHPRQLFGHFRQVWUXFWLQJWKHKXPDQLW\RIKXPDQEHLQJVµFULHVRXW¶WREHWDNHQXS
into theological discourse as a means for drawing on the energies for rehumanisation made 
DYDLODEOHWKURXJK*RG¶VDFWLYHPRYHPHQWWRUHGHHP 
On the whole, however, it is true that on the surface the torture literature functions 
mostly protectively and preventatively, more to resist future dehumanisation through torture 
than to offer redemptive transformation of the souls already broken and twisted through the 
twisting and breaking of their bodies.  
That being said, though, some of this literature makes explicit what is implicit in most 
of the rest. In a way that parallels imprecisely what we find in the feminist and black theological 
discussions already referred to, the torture discussion is undertaken in the context of a 
commitment to a deeper and broader redemptive transformation of the rhetorical, social and 
political context in which torture takes place and can be discussed as a morally defensible 
option. This resistance is presented sometimes as countering or undoing the demonic and 
idolatrous framing of the relationships between some human beings and others by the practice 
and advocacy of torture in the USA post-9/11. Occasionally this is spelt out in ways that make 
it clear that resistance to the dehumanising language and totalizing narrative that accompanies 
torture embodies resistance to a demonic and idolatrous social ordering.  By extension, it is not 
over-reaching to say it is a performed construction of a differently constituted sociality: a 
contribution towards reconstructed national and international polity. 28  Insofar as this is 
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Hoffmeyer offers more substantive and constructive consideration, setting the cross in context of resurrection and 
therefore redemption explicitly. See John F. Hoffmeyer, "Torture and Theology of the Cross," Dialog 47, no. 3 
(2008). It would be interesting to see this theme developed more thoroughly in relation to theological discussion 
of torture. But the reverse move seems even more compelling ± to return from the torture discussion to theological 
anthropology and consider anew the significance of the cross for a christological definition of the image; of the 
crucified Jesus as the clue to what humanity and God are. 
28 Cavanaugh, "Making Enemies," pp.248f; "Torture and Eucharist: A Regretful Update," in Torture Is a Moral 
Issue: Christians. Jews, Muslims, and People of Conscience Speak Out, ed. George Hunsinger (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2008); Cates, "Experiential Narratives of Rape and Torture; Hoffmeyer, "Torture and Theology of the 
explicitly alluded to in these texts, love29 and sometimes justice30 emerge variously as the 
active agents of or terminus for redemptive transformation. Loving or seeking justice do not 
function here primarily, I think, as means for the appropriate recognition of humanity or image 
of God already, unproblematically in place. Rather, they appear to be tools for seeking 
humanity where its existence and possibility are in real question; asking the anthropological 
question as a real question (and, arguably, asking it theologically). It is above all a refusal of a 
group of Christian theologians mostly living in the US to be conscripted into, or to overhear as 
bystanders, the idolatrous and totalizing demonisation offered through some of the more 
H[WUHPHUKHWRULFRIWKHµZDURQWHUURU¶.  
I see here parallels with Psalm 8, which poses the anthropological question 
theologically but appears not to answer it. Except the psalm is itself is an answer; in singing  
this psalm (and the whole corpus of the psalter), there is human imaging of God. If we look 
more at what is going on through the production of this literature, perhaps more than at the way 
it uses and defines the image within the texts, do we perhaps also see a performative answer to 
the anthropological question? an imaging of God in practices of asking what humanity is and 
how it is to be sought and redemptively transformed in this situation?  It might be considered 
itself a way of seeking the humanity of those proclaimed enemies, which the literature terms 
sometimes love of neighbour in the context of globalisation (the globalisation of American 
power, more specifically) in demonic forms. In the context of the rhetoric and practices of the 
µZDU RQ WHUURU¶ HVSHFLDOO\ LQ LWV HDUOLHVW LWHUDWLRQV LW LV SRWHQWially transformative to relate 
terrorist suspects as neighbours together within the same community, especially where torture 
happens often by rendition to areas legally constructed to be outside the constraints of either 
law or moral community. The balance of the literature is suspicious of the identification of 
enemies in a context where enmity appears rhetorically manufactured (especially under the 
LQIOXHQFHRI6FKPLWW¶VSROLWLFDOWKHRORJ\DQGVRWHQGVQRWWRVSHDNYHU\PXFKDERXWwhat is 
perhaps the most relevant, but also the most ambiguous biblical anthropological and ethical, 
trope ± enemies and love of enemies, respectively. Construing this literature and of the imaging 
of God required in our material, cultural, political situatedness as conjoining love with enmity 
might have more creative possibilities for those of us who acknowledge that we have enemies 
and seek to practise enmity towards terrorists in a way that is a form of also seeking their 
humanity rather than denigrating it; disciplined by love rather than a mode of hatred. But that 
is another paper. 
Whether expressed in relation to the more obviously particularising and situated biblical 
anthropological trope of neighbour or enemy combined in active orientation through love, we 
see here WKHLPDJLQJRI*RGDQGWKHDXWKRUV¶XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIZKDWWKDWPHDQVHYLGHQWLn 
seeking the humanisation of damaged and damaging humanity together in new patterns of 
relating towards their mutual flourishing; which is to say, not only a recognition of the actual 
humanity of those who have been or might in the future be tortured, but the humanisation of 
the rest of usGDPDJHGWKURXJKDOOWKHZD\VLQZKLFKZHDUHLPSOLFDWHGLQWKHµZDURQWHUURU¶
and that to which terrorists believe they respond. As in feminist and black theologies, 
theological anthropology appears as a performative discourse enabling and bringing humanity 
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where it is absent or at serious risk; imaging God by seeking the human as sought by God in 
active movement towards the redemption and eschatological consummation of specific human 
beings in the specific material and social conditions in which we find ourselves ± or rather do 
not and cannot find ourselves, except as we are sought and found first by God.  
Conclusion 
The primary task of theological anthropology is not to give an account of universal human 
nature, nor to provide supposedly universal definitions of the image of God. Its task is not to 
define the image of God but to image *RGWREHFRPPHQWDU\RQDQGSDUWLFLSDQWLQ*RG¶VDFWLYH
seeking of humanity in its full flourishing, focused on those places where humanity and its 
flourishing are counterfactual. This makes the image more like a verb than it is a noun; more 
dynamic than it is static; more performative than indicative.  
One consequence of this performative approach to theological anthropology is that it 
closes the distance between the anthropological tropes of dogmatic and systematic theology 
and those of Christian ethics and practical theology. The point, I am suggesting, of theological 
anthropology is to not so much to describe as to facilitate performance of humanity: our seeking 
the full humanity of ourselves and others as we are being sought by God. Thus the key 
coordinates of anthropological doctrine (such as the image) I argue have formally identical 
function and purpose to the key anthropological tropes of Christian ethics (neighbour; enemy; 
stranger; brother) and the key verbs we find operationalising the creative performance of  
redemptive rehumanisation (love; forgiveness). All share a common purpose and function: the 
seeking of full humanisation in relation to God, self and others, especially where we encounter 
constricting realities which dehumanise, disorient or diminish our full humanity. This seeking 
of the human, rather than description, is, I suggest, the chief anthropological interest of 
Christian faith and theology. 
Notwithstanding all that, however, deploying the concept of the image of God ± even 
using it to define the human ± can function as a tool for seeking the human as sought by God, 
imaging God, in our concrete proximate contexts. This moves us away from the notion that the 
image of God is something within us that we possess as a defining aspect of our nature. At the 
same time, it also moves us away from the idea that what is imaged is an aspect of the divine 
nature. Whether that be construed in terms of capacities or of relationality, traditional ways of 
construing the image construct a static form of parallelism between divine and human natures. 
Even where those natures are construed in relational, and therefore dynamic, terms, we have 
tended to construe our imaging of God as a static mirroring within us of what is within God. 
This more performative approach suggests our imaging of God represents our being caught up 
in the active presence and movement of God towards the world creatively, redemptively and 
eschatologically. We image God as that movement of God works through us, as we are caught 
up in it, in an active seeking of human and creaturely flourishing. 
I acknowledge this performative move is ambiguous and has significant dangers that 
cannot be easily side-stepped. My talk of dehumanization as existential possibility, especially 
combined with my reluctance to affirm the possession of an abstract human essence or nature, 
potentially sacrifices the security of humanity as an inalienable possession. It is that, after all, 
that has often funded talk of dignity and rights in respect of those regarded as less than human, 
that secures their dignity in ways demanding recognition, despite its active denial or 
denigration by abusers and oppressors, whether systemic or interpersonal. Moreover, my 
argument is capable of being read as suggesting that our humanity is entirely in the gift of 
others. That the dehumaniser always achieves dehumanisation of and within the abused, 
tortured, defiled, denigrated, oppressed and marginalised. That, without an internally 
possessed, fixed and static, asocial universal human nature, there is no point of resilience or 
resistance to practices of dehumanisation perpetrated by abusers, torturers, racialized or 
patriarchal systems of oppression and exclusion. Without an internal essential and inalienable 
human core, withdrawn from interaction, is our humanity at the mercy of those with the power 
to refuse its recognition? 
I have tried to describe adverting to a notion of human nature or essence (whether 
secular or theological) as a tool for the recognition of human dignity in resistance to 
dehumanisation in performative ways. That draws attention towards their effectiveness as tools 
for rehumanisation, regardless of whether there is some internal essential core of humanity 
resistant to attacks on dignity and base humanity. That will, I am aware, be thought inadequate 
by some. Must there not be some thing there worthy of recognition? Capable at least of being 
the target of what I call rehumanising activity, but might be considered better expressed as a 
rekindling of a humanity occluded and subject to profound damage, distortion or disorientation, 
but still somehow there? 
Whilst I acknowledge these concerns, I find myself wanting ± despite the dangers ± to 
retain the idea that our humanity ± resilient though it can indeed be ± really is in the hands of 
RWKHUV DQGRWKHUV¶ LQRXUV WKDWKXPDQEHLQJVFDQEHGHKXPDQLVHGDQGQRW MXVWVXEMHFW WR
dehumanising treatment (where the word then seems just a rhetorical flourish). We really can 
do damage to others and be ourselves damaged. Human beings can be damaged and damaging 
in their humanity (in fact, that is indeed the reality, as any half-way realistic doctrine of sin 
brings to expression).  And it is only in facing the depths of damage done to and done by us as 
having the possibility of radical dehumanisation that we take phenomena like torture, abuse, 
racism and patriarchy with the radical seriousness they demand; moreover, only so might we 
understand what rehumanisation entails. Risky indeed though it is, I want theological 
anthropology to sit a little while longer with what some victims of torture, abuse, oppression, 
report to be the consequences before supplying reassurance that they have not lost their 
humanity or sustained significant damage to it. I have met some survivors of torture  ± usually 
in circumstances where they have been subject to further revictimization; I have read too much 
Primo Levi; and I have met very many victims and survivors of systemic domestic and sexual 
abuse that makes me want to say that these can be circumstances in which the anthropological 
TXHVWLRQ LV D 5($/ TXHVWLRQ $V /HYL¶V LQFUHGLEOH ULII RQ 7KH 6KHPD ,VUDHO VXJJHVWV WKDW
precedes the English translation of If This is a Man: WKHµLI¶KDVXQFHUWDLQDQVZHU31 The damage 
and dehumanization are real. Again, to avoid misunderstanding, I also think the damage is 
universal ± WKHVH µH[WUHPH¶FDVHVPDNHPRUHREYLRXVZKDW is the case for the rest of us as 
victims, perpetrators, bystanders or as mostly is the case, a mixture of all three. We are dealing 
here with sin in its most comprehensive and radical reality.32 
Instead of a fixed and inalienable human nature or essence that secures dignity and 
identifies where we might speak of humanity, dehumanisation and rehumanisation, I suggest 
we do not look first towards the human as an independent existent or a universal essence. 
Rather, I suggest we turn our attention first to the God in active movement towards the full 
flourishing of humanity (full humanisation), and so towards biological human beings in their 
particularity DV WKH ORFLRI*RG¶VDFWLYHPRYHPHQW WRZDUGVXVFUHDWLYHO\ UHGHPSWLYHO\DQG
eschatologically. 
The relation of Christian talk of the human to the activity of God, eschatologically and 
redemptively as well as creatively, is hardly novel. It is written into the DNA of theological 
anthropology. A sense of that embeddedness of the human ± and therefore also talk of the 
human ± in the multi-faceted movement of God towards the world is the reason that theological 
anthropology took so long to constellate into a definite, individuated doctrinal locus. It is also 
                                                 
31 Primo Levi, If This Is a Man/the Truce, trans. Stuart Woolf (London: Abacus, 1987). 
32 See further McFadyen, Bound to Sin. 
why Christian faith turned to the image of God as its main conceptual placeholder to understand 
human being as related to by God; not because it looked first to the creation narratives in search 
of an original essence and found the phrase there, but through a strong sense that Jesus was 
actively imaging God in his life, death and resurrection (oriented towards those whose 
humanity was in doubt or at risk). Just as the creation narratives themselves were implicates of 
Israelite faith in God experienced as reconciling and saving the whole of the created order, so 
Christians looked back to those narratives out of a consciousness of the universal extensiveness 
RI*RG¶VPRYHPHQWWRUHFRQFLOHDQGUHGHHPWKHZRUOGLn which human responsiveness and 
responsibility played a significant role. 6R ZH DUH UHWXUQHG WR 3VDOP ¶V SRVLQJ RI WKH
anthropological question in a way that frames anthropological questioning and 
questionableness in the context of specific consciousness RI *RG¶V PRYHPHQW WRZDUGV WKH
world, creatively, redemptively and eschatologically, which incidentally begins also to suggest 
how we might distinguish theological from secular anthropologies ± not primarily by the 
answers given to the anthropological question, but by the way in and the reasons for which the 
question is asked. 
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